Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation

Abstract

ABSTRACT Introduction Cotard delusion—the delusional belief “I am dead”—is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard. Ramachandran and Blakeslee proposed that the idea “I am dead” comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if “I am dead” were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world. Methods We scrutinised the literature on people who expressed the delusional belief “I am dead”, looking for data on whether such patients are reported as entirely lacking in emotional responsivity. Results In numerous cases, patients with Cotard delusion are described as experiencing emotions including anxiety, fear, guilt, distress, euphoria and worry. Conclusions We conclude that complete absence of emotional responsivity cannot be what prompts the delusional idea that one is dead. We propose that, in at least some cases, the idea “I am dead” comes to mind in response to symptoms of depersonalisation or derealisation, often present in cases of Cotard delusion, and give examples of Cotard patients with abnormalities in various neural areas that could be responsible for the presence of such symptoms.