Cost-Effective Placement of Phasor Measurement Units to Defend against False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid

Junhyung Bae

doi:10.3390/en13153862

Abstract

This study presents the phasor measurement unit (PMU) placement strategy in the presence of false data injection attacks which is one of the most serious security threats against power grid. It is focused on applications related to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems where measurement data can be easily corrupted by adversaries without getting caught by the system. To safeguard power grids against malicious attacks, procedures have been proposed to facilitate the placement of secure PMUs to defend against false data injection attacks in a highly cost-effective way. It has formulated a method of identifying measurements that are vulnerable to false data injection attacks. It was discovered that a weak power grid can be transformed into a robust power grid by adding a few PMUs at vulnerable locations. Simulations on the IEEE standard test systems demonstrate the benefits of the proposed procedure.

Highlights

Cyber attacks are increasingly seen as a tremendous threat to modern power grid
This paper presents a simple, but effective procedure for optimal placement of phasor measurement unit (PMU) that ensures full observability and high level of cyber security
This paper proposes a framework that adds a few secure PMUs at buses with nonredundant measurements in the power grid to defeat false data injection attacks

Summary

Introduction

Cyber attacks are increasingly seen as a tremendous threat to modern power grid. As supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems become more interconnected, the connection between the power network and the Internet-connected management network makes them highly vulnerable to intrusions. In connection with the Northeast blackout of 2003, the first malicious software code known to target SCADA systems were reported to have tried to infect thousands of remote terminal units (RTUs) [1]. On 23 December 2015, a synchronized and coordinated cyber attacks damaged three Ukrainian power distribution companies, causing power outages to approximately 225,000 customers over several hours [2]. This worm-like behavior exacerbates the problem if a compromised system can cause extensive damage to the power grid as well as other critical infrastructures

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Conclusion