Abstract
With the popularity of vehicular communication systems and mobile edge vehicle networking, intelligent transportation applications arise in Internet of Vehicles (IoVs), which are latency-sensitive, computation-intensive, and requiring sufficient computing and communication resources. To satisfy the requirements of these applications, computation offloading emerges as a new paradigm to utilize idle resources on vehicles to cooperatively complete tasks. However, there exist several obstacles for realizing successful task offloading among vehicles. For one thing, extra cost such as communication overhead and energy consumption occurs when a task is offloaded on a service vehicle, it is unlikely to expect the service vehicle will contribute its resources without any reward. For another, since there are many vehicles around, both user vehicles and service vehicles are trying to strike a balance between cost and profit, through matching the perfect service/user vehicles and settled with optimal offloading plan that is beneficial to all parties. To solve these issues, this work focuses on the design of effective incentive mechanisms to stimulate vehicles with idle resources to actively participate in the offloading process. A fuzzy logic-based dynamic pricing strategy is proposed to accurately evaluate the cost of a vehicle for processing the task, which provides insightful guidance for finding the optimal offloading decision. Meanwhile, the competitive and cooperation relations among vehicles are thoroughly investigated and modeled as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Particularly, this work emphasizes the social attributes of vehicles and their effect on the offloading decision making process, multiple key properties such as the willingness of UV to undertake the task locally, the reputation of UV and the satisfaction of SV for the allocated task proportion, are carefully integrated in the design of the optimization problem. A distributed algorithm with applicable complexity is proposed to solve the problem and to find the optimal task offloading strategy. Extensive simulations are conducted on real-world scenarios and results show that the proposed mechanism achieves significant performance advantages in terms of vehicles' utilities, cost, completion delay under varied network and channel environment, which justifies the effectiveness and efficiency of this work.
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