Abstract
Cosmological idealism (CI) is a special kind of mereological idealism. According to CI, reality as a whole essentially includes thinking subjects who represent it as such. This chapter presents the outline of a form of CI that is prima facie stable. Despite its struggle with paradox, CI apparently fares better than naïve cosmological realism at explaining the ontological status of the ‘world.’ The Russellian reflex is an echo of Russell’s conversion from British idealism to mathematical philosophy, which rests on his discovery that the kind of idealism with which he was acquainted directly lands one with a set-theoretical paradox. There are historical reasons why metaphysical idealism of the sort characterized has been replaced in Anglophone philosophy by ‘kneejerk realism’. If anything, the majority of recent Anglophone philosophers over the last hundred years or so have followed Russell’s and Moore’s condemnation of British idealism’s core idea that the absolute whole is mind-dependent or even a mind.
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