Cosmological Arguments

Abstract

Inductive cosmological arguments are prima facie more promising for the natural theologian than deductive arguments, such as the Kalam cosmological argument, which is not sound. In the cosmological scenario of an infinitely old universe, however, there is no valid explanandum for the hypothesis of theism. The claim that theism might explain the infinite series of time-slices of the universe ‘as a whole’ is based upon a fallacy of ambiguity. There is no valid explanandum either for a synchronic cosmological argument. Finally, the argument from the Big Bang to God is problematic for a multitude of reasons. It cannot avoid the risk of God-of-the-gaps. It cannot satisfy the relevance condition, because the likelihood of the Big Bang singularity given theism is negligible (if it can be determined at all). Also, the prior probability of the Big Bang singularity cannot be small compared to that of God, for example (if it can be determined at all).