Corruption in the commons: why bribery hampers enforcement of environmental regulations in South African fisheries

Aksel Sundström

doi:10.18352/ijc.370

Abstract

Few studies have explored on the micro-level why corruption hampers environmental regulations. The relationship between corruption and regulatory compliance is here investigated through confidential in-depth interviews with South African small-scale fishermen. Respondents describe how the expected behavior of inspectors and other resource users to ask for or accept bribes are vital in their compliance decisions. The interviews also shed some light on the puzzling role of trust and trustworthiness of public officials. While resource users often knows inspectors personally – and uphold discretion necessary for bribery to continue – they depict them as dishonest and describe how corrupt acts decrease their trustworthiness. The findings from the South African case illustrate the importance of curbing both grand and petty corruption to increase the effectiveness of regulations in natural resource management.

Highlights

In recent decades it has become evident that environmental degradation is a growing problem with implications for poverty reduction as well as for the health of ecosystems
The relationship between corruption and regulatory compliance is here investigated through confidential in-depth interviews with South African small-scale fishermen
Respondents describe how the expected behavior of inspectors and other resource users to ask for or accept bribes are vital in their compliance decisions

Summary

Introduction

In recent decades it has become evident that environmental degradation is a growing problem with implications for poverty reduction as well as for the health of ecosystems. Following the institutional turn within much of the social sciences, research today emphasizes that this degradation often stems from institutional failures Corruption has been described as an evil with ecological implications. Plenty of anecdotal evidence suggests that corruption harms the environment; bribery assists poaching of rhinos in protected savannas and enables the illegal logging of timber in tropical forest reserves. Systematic empirical studies find that corruption is associated with measures of over-exploitation of natural resources (Messer 2000; Welsch 2004; Esty et al 2005; Walpole and Smith 2005; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006; Wright et al 2007; Leader-Williams et al 2009). Our understanding of this relationship still contains certain gaps of knowledge

Methods

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Discussion

Conclusion