Corruption in social relations: Bribe‐taking, corruptibility, and corruption risks

Abstract

AbstractThis inquiry aims to investigate how the relational dynamics are imprinted on two critical dimensions of bribe‐taking: corruptibility and corruption risks. Two treatments were randomly administered to 1400 subjects: single versus repeated interactions and strangers versus weak ties. The findings suggest that repeated interactions induce bigger bribe sizes, but also increase risks from whistleblowing and internal auditing. Weak ties mitigate bribe‐taking willingness. Nevertheless, when coupled with repeated interactions, weak ties suppress the risks from whistleblowing, testifying the bifurcated effects. The tensions between corruptibility and corruption risks suggest that bribe‐taking decisions are fraught with internal tensions, with the overall effects likely being a priori determined only in specific contexts. Such tensions are more intensified among true bureaucrats as they tend to claim bigger bribes and report more risks from internal auditing.