Corruption, formal institutions, and foreign direct investment: The case of OECD countries in Africa

Abstract

AbstractPurposeCorruption has shown a mixed impact on foreign direct investment (FDI). This study proposed moderating the role of two—foreign aid (international institution) from the home country and democracy (national institution) in the host country—between corruption‐FDI nexus.MethodologyThe framework is analyzed using panel data analysis (2001–2018) of bilateral foreign aid and FDI from 18 European members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to 34 African countries.FindingsThe presents several key findings. First, Africa's level of government corruption harms bilateral FDI from Europe. Second, the OECD's bilateral foreign aid moderates the negative effects of Africa's host‐country corruption on FDI. Third, the level of democracy in the host country also moderates the negative impact of corruption on FDI. Finally, foreign aid strongly moderates the negative effect of corruption on FDI in democratic countries compared to non‐democratic host countries.Research ImplicationsThis study provides the institutional analysis that bilateral foreign aid and democracy as formal institutions affect the European multinational enterprises's decision to invest in Africa.Practical ImplicationsIt presents the policy and managerial implications. First, European MNEs managers avoid investing in Africa, and governments must take strict actions to attract FDI. Second, foreign aid and democracy motivate MNEs to invest in Africa. Finally, the OECD policymaker could formulate rigorous and relevant conditions for foreign aid to Africa to reduce corruption.Originality/ValueThrough the lens of institutional theory and selectorate theory, the novel institutional role of foreign aid and democracy is proposed and tested between the nexus of corruption‐FDI.