Corruption and economic growth with non constant labor force growth

Abstract

Based on Brianzoni et al. [1] in the present work we propose an economic model regarding the relationship between corruption in public procurement and economic growth. We extend the benchmark model by introducing endogenous labor force growth, described by the logistic equation. The results of previous studies, as Del Monte and Papagni [2] and Mauro [3], show that countries are stuck in one of the two equilibria (high corruption and low economic growth or low corruption and high economic growth). Brianzoni et al. [1] prove the existence of a further steady state characterized by intermediate levels of capital per capita and corruption. Our aim is to investigate the effects of the endogenous growth around such equilibrium. Moreover, due to the high number of parameters of the model, specific attention is given to the numerical simulations which highlight new policy measures that can be adopted by the government to fight corruption.