Corrupting the Battlefield: How Corruption Influences Belligerents’ Battlefield Performance

Abstract

In some modern conflicts, stronger militaries have displayed poor performance in conflicts, as evidenced by slow military offensives, high battlefield casualty rates, failure to secure planned objectives and defeat in the war. Poor conflict performance, in these cases, is attributed to material and certain non-material state characteristics such as regime type, economic development, and ideology. Current explanations of conflict performance, however, have yet to integrate empirical evidence identifying another state characteristic as a negative influence on state capacity: corruption. To address this gap, we identify direct and indirect theoretical channels by which state-level corruption impacts conflict performance. Corruption decreases the war material available to troops on the ground and negatively impacts strategic decision-making by commanders. An analysis of states in interstate conflicts from 1816 to 1990 confirms the relationship between corruption and several measures of conflict performance. Case evidence from the First Russian-Chechen War is used to illustrate the mechanisms of our argument.