Corrupting or Stabilizing: The Political Economy of Corruption in Donbas’s “People’s Republics”

Gabriella Gricius

doi:10.18523/kmlpj189980.2019-5.37-57

Abstract

A wide range of normative implications exists between corruption and the stability of de-facto states. While some claim that corruption inherently disrupts institutional development and stumps economic growth, others argue that corruption in some cases acts as a stabilizing factor for authoritarian regimes. Regardless, corruption generally plays a role in the political economy of any state. In de-facto states, corruption tends to play an outsized role, either or equally impacting the exercise of political authority or the allocation of public goods and services. This research aims to examine the case study of the Luhansk and Donetsk “People’s Republics” and the relationship between corruption and governance in these two de-facto regions to better understand how corruption and stability are interrelated. Methodologically, I plan to use mostly political economy methods, namely focusing on using Goodhand’s framework of analyzing different economies during conflict. I will rely mostly on open-source information for this preliminary research to determine what the governance structure is, namely focusing on the DPR’s and the LPR’s respective governments.

Highlights

The Donbas conflict erupted in 2014 in the wake of Euromaidan Revolution and the flight of former President Viktor Yanukovych
While there is less information regarding corruption within the Luhansk “People’s Republic,” it can be suggested that as long as corruption within the region stays relatively low-level, such as stable patron-client relationships and other petty forms of corruption, it is acting as a contributing factor towards stable governance. Looking at these two regions over their three separate economies, several observations can be made about the relationship between corruption, governance and stability. It appears that both in the de-facto Luhansk “People’s Republic” (LPR) and the Donetsk “People’s Republic” (DPR), corruption plays an integral role in how decisions are made and how different people come to power
After the DPR and LPR were excluded from the international financial system, this shift has given Russia a stronger hand in deciding who remains in power and who is exiled from the two territories

Summary

Introduction

The Donbas conflict erupted in 2014 in the wake of Euromaidan Revolution and the flight of former President Viktor Yanukovych. Since both the de-facto Donetsk and the Luhansk “People’s Republic” (DPR and LPR, respectively) have claimed independence, and, three million citizens exist outside the control of the Ukrainian government.. Both the de-facto Donetsk and the Luhansk “People’s Republic” (DPR and LPR, respectively) have claimed independence, and, three million citizens exist outside the control of the Ukrainian government.2 These so-called de-facto states present an interesting case for corruption scholars. In situations where governance is not assured, corruption is simultaneously seen as a barrier towards successful state-building as well as a stabilizing factor for a new political order..

Objectives

Methods

Findings

Conclusion