Abstract

Marian David defends the correspondence theory of truth against the disquotational theory of truth, its current major rival. The correspondence theory asserts that truth is a philosophically rich and profound notion which needs serious explanation. Disquotationalism is a radically deflationary philosophy of truth inspired by Tarski and propagated by Quine and others. It rejects the correspondence theory, insists truth is anemic, and advances an anti-theory of truth that is essentially a collection of platitudes: Snow is white is true only if snow is actually white; Grass is green is true only if grass is actually green. According to disquotationalists the only profound insight about truth is that it lacks profundity. David contrasts the correspondence theory with disquotationalism and then develops the latter position in rich detail - more than has been available in previous literature - to show its faults. He demonstrates that disquotationalism is not a tenable theory of truth, as it has too many absurd consequences.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.