Abstract

<p>The aim of this paper is to offer an impression of the issues raised by the disclosure of companies’ tax information by supplying existing and historical viewpoints from the aspects of concepts, theory, constraints, benefits and measurements. We are concerned that full disclosure of organizations' tax information could result in firms weakening tax information, hampering tax enforcement, and maybe, in a weakened structure, disclosing private data that could give a competitive benefit to those organizations that are not requested to do such a disclosure. Hence, some studies do not underpin full disclosure. On the other hand, full tax disclosure could have numerous beneficial impacts. It might put pressure on regulators to develop the tax system and it might incite companies to oppose aggressive tax decrease strategies. We anticipate and expect interested parties to take into consideration the best practices of tax disclosure in implementing their future plans.</p>

Highlights

  • Introduction and BackgroundPomp (1993) claimed that the issue of state company tax disclosure was raised in 1987 by a staff study for New York State's Legislative Tax Study Commission

  • The aim of this paper is to offer an impression of the issues raised by the disclosure of companies’ tax information by supplying existing and historical viewpoints from the aspects of concepts, theory, constraints, benefits and measurements

  • Tax transparency through applying tax disclosure norms challenges the tax policy standards developed within this yard, whilst the interest for activists in non-governmental organizations challenges the institutional foundations of contemporary worldwide tax policy-making (Christians, 2013)

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Summary

Introduction and Background

Pomp (1993) claimed that the issue of state company tax disclosure was raised in 1987 by a staff study for New York State's Legislative Tax Study Commission. Activists around the globe call on governments to request disclosure of information for public users from companies about what, what amount and where on the globe firms, multinational firms, pay taxes (Christians, 2013) Their point is to stir public thoughtfulness to the systemic under-taxation of multinational companies, to demonstrate that this is linked to the failure of development in developing countries, and to persuade law-makers that the public is curious in changing this model. In their mission for financial transparency through tax disclosure, activists are admitting themselves to an elite policy-making yard that has customarily been dominated by the political elites and seeking change. The fifth part of this paper reviews literature in the measurement of tax disclosure and, the last part is concluded

Definitions of Tax Disclosure
Theories of Tax Disclosure
Political Costs Theory
Signalling Theory
Tax Disclosure Objectives
Constraints of Tax Disclosure
Disclosure of Tax Information Violation Confidentiality
Tax Disclosure Could Create Confusion
Information to Government
Unintended Behavioural Responses to Disclosure
Potential Obstacles among Tax Disclosure Costs
Benefits of Tax Disclosure
Measuring Companies’ Tax Loopholes
Tax Disclosure Motivate and Aid Government Regulators
Develop Financial Markets Functioning
Tax Disclosure Motivate and Promote Tax Compliance
Tax Disclosure Increases Political Pressure for Good Tax Policy
Motives for Managers to Manipulate Reserves and Disclosures
Potential Advantages of Poor Disclosure Managers
Potential Benefits of Excess Disclosure Managers
Measurements of Tax Disclosure
Findings
Conclusions
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