Corporate risk-taking, firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts

Abstract

We examine the impact of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts, an important form of voluntary disclosure, on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a policy of high disclosure may reduce managers' willingness to invest in higher-risk, higher-return projects. We first verify, as in prior research, that corporate risk-taking is associated with higher future firm value. We then document a negative relation between firms with high levels of forecasting and corporate risk-taking. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that high levels of managerial earnings forecasts reduce the positive association between corporate risk-taking and future firm value. Our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and future firm value, and alternative definitions of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts. Our results may be of importance to varying interests as they highlight the potential for high levels of earnings forecasts to inhibit corporate risk-taking and lower firm value.