Abstract
AbstractThis study examines whether corporate reputation affects derivative hedging. We posit that high‐reputation firms are more likely to engage in hedging due to greater reputation costs and/or their commitment to lower financial risks. We find that high‐reputation firms are more likely to engage in hedging, especially when their hedging efforts or effects are more observable to stakeholders. We also find that high‐reputation firms are less likely to disclose the notional values of hedging positions and that interest rate hedging by high‐reputation firms is detrimental to firm value. Our results shed light on the impact of reputational concerns on corporate risk management and disclosure policies.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
