Corporate lobbying in the UK: an analysis of attitudes towards the ASB's 1995 deferred taxation proposals

Abstract

This paper models corporate lobbying behaviour with respect to the ASB's 1995 discussion paper on deferred taxation. The study makes improvements to the methodology applied in prior studies. It expands the definition of lobbying beyond the submission of comment letters. It extends the analysis to control for past lobbying behaviour. It uses multinomial logistic regression to consider those companies lobbying in favour, those lobbying against, and those that did not lobby. The findings suggest that size and past lobbying behaviour are key determinants of the decision to lobby. In addition, companies that lobbied against the proposals were more likely to have debt covenants than were those that lobbied in favour. Debt covenants, however, did not explain the difference between non-lobbyists and lobbyists against. Companies that lobbied in favour were more likely to experience incentive compensation effects than were those that lobbied against. There was some evidence of the influence of US listing.