Abstract
AbstractWe examine the stock prices of defense firms surrounding the reopening of markets after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The cumulative abnormal returns for defense firms increased dramatically in response to the attacks, which is arguably explained by the expectation of impending military conflict and the possibility of new defense spending. Perhaps more interestingly, a substantial amount of the variation in the price response across defense firms is driven by whether or not the firm had established political connections through lobbying activities or political action committee contributions before the attacks. These findings seem to support the notion that market participants perceived that defense firms with political connections were more likely to secure future military contracts.
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