Abstract
This thesis examines the relevance of corporate governance to the likelihood of bank misconduct and subsequent reputational loss over the period 2000-2014. Regulatory enforcement actions issued by major U.S. banking supervisors are used to identify whether a bank has engaged in misconduct. I adopt the residual method to estimate the magnitude of reputational loss following the announcement of enforcement actions, and observe that potential reputational loss plays an important role in disciplining banks' behavior. I find board heterogeneity (i.e., board size and diversity) is significantly non-linearly associated with the likelihood of bank misconduct and the magnitude of the reputational loss.
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