Abstract
The article concerned issues, related to the characteristics of Corporate governance and performance. The characteristics of Corporate governance are pervasive: ownership structure, separation from control, Board of directors, protection of rights. For Russian companies traditional organizational characteristics of life cycle stages are not decisive. Currently there is a tendency for owners to get out from management and focus on social, environmental results. The ownership of private insiders is the highest at the stage of formation, and the foreign ownership rises at the stage of growth. Based on the model was estimated significant positive impact of companies’ age on an increase in property rights, ownership and control, protecting minority investors encourages R&D. Results of estimation of 62 countries in 2020 represented significant positive relation Technology factors: adaptive attitudes, business agility, IT integration with performance and Corporate governance. An increase in digital is associated with a higher quality of Corporate governance.
Highlights
The quality of Corporate governance (CG), first of all, is based on taking into account the interests of the company's stakeholders both in the short-term and long-term period
The configuration of ownership and management is associated with the stage of life cycle in developed capital markets, when the founderentrepreneur is the main initiator of the formation of the company
The life cycle stage is mainly defined with management features and characters at various stages.The age and size of the company, its organizational structure, formalization, crises, and preferences of economic agents, agency relation and leadership are characteristics of the life cycle stages according to traditional approaches [5]
Summary
The quality of Corporate governance (CG), first of all, is based on taking into account the interests of the company's stakeholders both in the short-term and long-term period. Principal-agent relations have been studied under the owner-manager concept and the positive agency theory in the context of the ownership separation from the control This is a natural step in the company’s development, when the founders delegate their governance functions to professional management, as discussed by A.A. Berle and G.C. Means [1]. Most agent-principal models are aimed at investigating conflicts of interest between the management and the owners This conflict results from opportunistic behavior in spending the company’s resources for the managers’ own needs, excessive growth of remunerations, misuse of the company’s funds, unreasonably high benefits, payments and preferences to the managers. Studying Russian companies, researchers have found significant differences in specifics of principal-agent relations, a high concentration of ownership and its impact on corporate activities compared foreign firm in developed capital market. In companies with a low concentration, the goals of the owners differ mostly and agency contradictions are growing, the presence of a strong owner, who has a strong and predictable strategy, contradiction are mitigated, but an extremely high concentration can lead to discrimination
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