Abstract
This paper examines a series of DaimlerChrysler events and finds unique evidence about whether disclosure requirements can compensate for weak corporate governance standards in protecting minority shareholders from expropriation. We show that strict disclosure requirements, though they improve the flow of information to all shareholders, fail фto substitute for strong corporate governance measures. Strict disclosure complements strong corporate governance, and both may be required to create environments in which firms can raise capital and fund growth opportunities most efficiently
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