Corporate governance and the market reaction to stock repurchase announcement

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of corporate governance on market reaction around of a stock repurchase announcement. We argue that corporate governance affects the ability of a stock repurchase to alleviate agency costs related to free cash flows, and the credibility of the undervaluation signal sent by the announcement of buyback programs. We find a higher 3-day cumulative abnormal return to programs announced by firms with better corporate governance practices than those with bad governance (1.6% and 0.85% respectively), and the market reaction is significantly higher following the successive scandals in year 2001 (Enron, Arthur Anderson, WorldCom…) and the resulting Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Further investigations indicate that firms with a lower Free Cash Flow to Asset ratio have a higher market reaction, which is consistent with the information signaling hypothesis, and this is more significant in firms with good governance practices, and following post Sarbanes–Oxley Act.