Corporate governance and the capital structure behavior: empirical evidence from France

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to test the validity of dynamic tradeoff theory and argue that the speed of adjustment toward the target capital structure may vary depending primarily on some inherent firm characteristics.Design/methodology/approachThe objective of this article is to study the impact of the corporate governance arrangements on the capital structure behavior taken by listed French firms. The author measures the corporate governance arrangements in three different ways to capture its influences on the capital structure and analyze how it affects a firm's rebalancing behavior in the presence of relevant control variables. Assuming that costs related to deviations from the target leverage are positively correlated with the duration of the deviation, the author finds that firms with a strong governance system adjust at a faster rate because the longer the deviation lasts, the greater the loss in firm value. In addition, firms with more efficient governance structures face lower adjustment costs.FindingsThe author measures corporate governance quality in different ways by using several proxies. The results make a major contribution to the literature and show that the quality of the governance system is an important factor in helping the company achieve fatly its target leverage. The authors produces further support for the initial finding by showing that the two extreme leverage deviation groups are dominated by firms with weak governance. The author also shows that the rebalancing speed is faster for firms with strong governance systems.Originality/valueThe paper proposes that a firm characterized by a strong governance system will display a shorter-duration deviation from the target capital structure and a higher adjustment level than a firm with weak governance. In other words, the author argues that the deviation from the target capital structure and the adjustment level are related to the quality of corporate governance. The results indicate that firms with a stronger governance structure are characterized by shorter-term deviations from the target. The author also finds that firms belonging to the two subsamples where leverage deviation is at extremely high or low levels are characterized by a weak governance system. The results corroborate the hypothesis on the speed of adjustment toward the desired target leverage. Furthermore, the author empirically proves that the adjustment level of firms with stronger governance is higher in both extreme leverage situations. This paper extends the existing literature on capital structure adjustment by introducing the effect of corporate governance.