Corporate governance and returns to emerging economy firm acquisitions in tax havens: An empirical test on Indian firms

Abstract

AbstractCross‐border acquisitions (CBAs) by emerging economy firms are known to yield positive stockholder returns. A nontrivial fraction of CBAs by emerging economy firms are in tax havens. We argue because of weak corporate governance in emerging economies and the secrecy afforded by tax havens, emerging economy firm CBAs in tax havens yield lower stockholder returns than their CBAs in nontax havens. We also argue the negative effect of tax haven destinations is greater for firms with greater business group ownership and for firms with greater foreign insider ownership. Furthermore, we argue the negative effect of tax haven destinations is mitigated for firms whose stock is actively traded in the market. Empirical tests in a sample of nearly 800 CBAs by Indian firms from 2002 to 2011 support our hypotheses. Our study contributes to a better understanding of stockholder returns to CBAs by emerging economy firms and the influence of corporate governance on these returns.