Abstract
We examine the role of the board, ownership, and CEO characteristics in CEO compensation in Indian firms. Contrary to the evidence documented in prior studies, we find that CEO compensation is not associated with board characteristics. Instead, compensation is associated with firm's ownership attributes and its CEO's tenure. We also document that leaving out CEO fixed effects in a longitudinal compensation study can lead to potentially erroneous conclusions about the role of several governance attributes in CEO compensation contracting. Finally, we find that CEO compensation attributed to ownership characteristics in the private sector is positively related to future firm performance, whereas remuneration attributed to board and CEO characteristics in both private and public sectors are not. Our evidence is consistent with efficient CEO compensation contracting, rather than CEO rent extraction, in Indian firms.
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