Corporate earnings management strategy under environmental regulation: Evidence from China

Abstract

In response to external adverse factors affecting corporate performance, managers may be motivated to engage in earnings manipulation. Environmental regulation as an institutional factor threatens normal earnings for heavy-polluting firms. This paper discusses corporate earnings management strategy under an environmental regulation policy. A multistage difference-in-differences (DID) estimation is performed, based on the central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) that is widely acknowledged as China's most stringent environmental policy. The results show that heavy-polluting firms significantly adjust their earnings management strategy after CEPI. Managers tend to adopt real activities manipulation with the effects of CEPI, while reducing their reliance on accrual-based earnings management. CEPI stimulates heavy-polluting firms to increase environmental investment, which makes their managers more likely to manage earnings through real activity manipulation, simultaneously resulting in the reduction of discretionary accruals. This earnings management strategy only appears in firms inspected in 2016 or non-state-owned enterprises or firms located in the regions with low environmental pressure. Our findings show that managers could use the chances provided by exogenous shocks to manipulate earnings.