Corporate crime and state legitimacy: the 2008 Chinese melamine milk scandal

Abstract

Corporate crime is a worldwide problem [41], but the burgeoning reported economic crime rate in China [33] involving such acts as poisoned food [109] and rampant environmental pollution [95], provide a unique opportunity to study the nature of such offending in a country whose economy is growing faster than any other in history. China retained authoritarian one-party control as the nation transitioned from the collectivist economy established by Mao Zedong to the current Bsocialist market economy,^ a capitalist market system combined with state-owned-enterprises. This combination of control and capital may help explain the documented rise in whitecollar and corporate offending in China, and provides a unique backdrop for examining the relevance of theories developed through the study of western capitalist societies. Few scholarly works exist that examine similarities and differences between corporate crime in China with offenses in the west [19, 46]. One paramount issue is whether such illegalities are subject to Bnon-issue making^ [29, 47] where the state provides de facto approval for injurious behaviors through non-response. Not all corporate offenses in the west are treated in this manner as some have argued that selectivity in regulatory enforcement results in the investigation of crimes that threaten capital accumulation [17]. This is likely due to the state’s desire to maintain a balance between its essential functions: capital accumulation and government legitimacy [69, 73]. While there appears to be evidence for such theories in western capitalist democracies, their applicability to single-party states such as China has yet to be examined by scholars. The aim of this study is to compare Chinese state response to corporate crime with that of capitalist democracies given the People’s Republic of China’s authoritarian, oneparty rule. It seeks to answer four questions regarding China’s response to economic crime. First, to what extent do local and national enforcement agencies in China allow Crime Law Soc Change (2015) 63:247–267 DOI 10.1007/s10611-015-9567-5