Abstract
This paper investigates the role of corporate governance quality on corporate cash holdings of the firms listed in Borsa Istanbul 100 Index for the period 2009-2013. System- GMM panel regressions are used in order to test the hypothesis. It is found that as the corporate governance quality decreases, cash holding ratios of the firms increase. Therefore, in case of poor investor protection, the managers use the firms' resources for their own interests at the expense of shareholders. This conflict can be solved with the increased corporate governance quality. http://dx.doi.org/10.17130/ijmeb.2016icafr22481
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