Coronavirus and Fraud in the UK: From the Responsibilisation of the Civil Society to the Deresponsibilisation of the State

Abstract

The sudden move of our lives online during the coronavirus pandemic has dramatically increased fraud risks. The personal and economic harms are enormous. The UK Government is responding with a two-fold approach. On the one hand, it relies on traditional law enforcement. On the other hand, it seeks to encourage individuals, businesses and public agencies to take responsibility in controlling and preventing crime by changing their practices through information campaigns and risk assessment and management., a strategy known as 'responsibilisation'. While literature in the last few decades has broadly analysed the social implications of responsibilisation on crime control in general, not many studies have focused on the specific area of financial crime. This study assesses the UK response to COVID-19-related fraud risks in light of the literature on responsibilisation through a comparative review of different policies and practices by various government agencies. Our analysis will reveal that the UK Government’s two-fold approach to fraud and financial crime is inherently inadequate to effectively prevent crime. Strained law enforcement agencies and regulators struggle to cope with the high numbers of reported frauds. As a result, both deterrence and retribution are undermined. On the other hand, the fixation on the surgical identification, dissection and rectification of a myriad of micro-situations that can entail a risk of crime causes the government to lose sight of the root causes of crime - biological, psychological, social, cultural, economic and political. After our critical discussion, we will put forwards some recommendations to improve not only COVID-19-related anti-fraud policies and practices but, more generally, the response to fraud and financial crime.