Abstract
In this paper I study corner solutions in a Model of Military Alliances. In particular I analyze how corner solutions affect the level of defence expenditure. I find that accounting for corner solutions, the so called ‘Exploitation Hypothesis’ may no longer be reversed and can indeed be reinforced as one moves from the Cournot to the Stackelberg equilibrium. JEL Classification: A1 – General Economics
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