Abstract
Considering the government reward and punishment mechanism and the collusion behavior between third-party testing agencies and drug enterprises, based on the coregulation information platform, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of coregulation supervision, which involves the participation of local government, drug enterprises, and third-party testing agencies. The stable equilibrium points of each participant’s strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov’s first method, and MATLAB 2020b is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players’ strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, the government-increased awards and penalties will promote the integrity of drug enterprises and noncollusion of third-party testing agencies, but it is not conducive to strict performance of regulatory responsibilities by the local government. Secondly, the provision of real drug test reports by third-party testing agencies to the coregulation information platform can supervise drug enterprises and restrict local government to perform its duty. Thirdly, the central government’s punishment to the local government’s dereliction of duty is significant to enhancing the robustness of drug enterprises’ integrity operation. Furthermore, reasonably setting rewards and punishments and perfecting the coregulation information platform will help form a coregulation pattern of government supervision, self-discipline of drug enterprises, and social supervision. Finally, drug quality is highly related to whether drug enterprises operate with integrity. Standardizing coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation is the key to ensuring the safety of the source of drug quality. Therefore, this paper enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.
Highlights
Australia has gradually established a relatively complete drug regulatory system. rough the joint consultation of industry members, the opinions and suggestions of member enterprises are reflected on the government in order to exert influence on government decision-making. e drug administration shall perform supervision and management functions within the scope prescribed by law and implement appropriate reward and punishment mechanisms. e Chinese government has very strict regulatory requirements for drug enterprises
In order to promote scientific drug supervision and continue to build a healthy China, it has carried out international exchanges and technology introduction and established a scientific and reasonable drug enterprises supervision system based on national conditions
By the stability theorem of replication dynamic system and Lyapunov’s first method, the stability of the strategic combination and the influence of changes in decision variables on strategic choice are analyzed [6], which are aiming to solve the following three problems: at first, how does the reward and punishment mechanism affect the strategic choices of three participants, how to play the role in the coregulation information platform to promote the coregulation supervision, and how does the participation of local government and third-party testing agencies affect the strategic choices of drug enterprises
Summary
Drug enterprises’ integrity operation affects drug quality and safety, which is related to people’s life and health, economic development, and social stability. e World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that government be responsible for establishing national medicine regulatory agencies (MRA), clarify their responsibilities, exert effective market control capabilities, and establish a monitoring and evaluation mechanism. e US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) focuses on cultivating talents and setting up regulatory scientific institutions to effectively fill the knowledge gaps in the research and development of drugs, reduce the uncertainty of regulatory decision-making, and ensure that drug enterprises produce high-quality drugs to meet the needs of patients and the market. e European Medicines Agency (EMA) has established a relatively complete drug risk supervision system for a long time to ensure that the public can use drugs safely and effectively. By the stability theorem of replication dynamic system and Lyapunov’s first method, the stability of the strategic combination and the influence of changes in decision variables on strategic choice are analyzed [6], which are aiming to solve the following three problems: at first, how does the reward and punishment mechanism affect the strategic choices of three participants, how to play the role in the coregulation information platform to promote the coregulation supervision, and how does the participation of local government and third-party testing agencies affect the strategic choices of drug enterprises. E remaining parts of this paper are arranged as follows: Section 2 combs and reviews the relevant literature; Section 3 makes hypotheses and constructs an evolutionary game model which involves local government, drug enterprises, and third-party testing agencies; Section 4 analyzes the stability of the strategic choice of the three participants; Section 5 analyzes the stability of strategic combination according to Lyapunov’s first method; Section 6 is the simulation analysis with MATLAB 2020b; Section 7 discusses and outlines related suggestions; and Section 8 provides the conclusions
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