Coping with a Smart Jammer in Wireless Networks: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Abstract

Jamming defense is an important yet challenging problem. In this paper, we study the jamming defense problem in the presence of a smart jammer, who can quickly learn the transmission power of the user and adaptively adjust its transmission power to maximize the damaging effect. We consider both the single-channel model and the multi-channel model. By modeling the problem as a Stackelberg game, we compute the optimal transmission power for the user to maximize its utility, in the presence of a smart jammer. For the single-channel model, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) by giving closed-form expressions for the SE strategies of both the user and the player. For the multi-channel model, we prove the existence of the SE. We design algorithms for computing the jammer's best response strategy and approximating the user's optimal strategy. Finally, we validate our theoretical analysis through extensive simulations.