Copernicus and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method of Correspondence Thinking

Abstract

This article is a development of my earlier papers entitled “Copernicus’ corres-pondence thinking” and “Copernicus’ astronomical works — A remarkable case of applying the methodological idea of correspondence” which were delivered at the XIXth International Congress of History of Science (22-29.08.1993, Zaragoza, Spain) and 10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (19-25.08.1995 Florence, Italy). To avoid misunderstandings at the very beginning of this article, let us explain here, that the term the ‘correspondence thinking’ has for us a special, methodological character that is closely connected, among other things, with the process of framing by theorists the theories which are linked by the correspondence principle. Regarding the linguistic form, the term ‘correspondence thinking" is comprehended by us as equivalent to Feyerabend’s German term “Korrespondenzdenken” that denotes the sort of thinking of Bohr, Kramers and Heisenberg, which was centered on Bohr’s correspondence principle (see Feyerabend [1962a] p. 203, p. 254 fn. 2). However, the term the ‘correspondence thinking’ will be comprehended by us in the broader sense on which we will say more below.