Abstract
AbstractInstitutional overlap emerges not only as an unintended by-product of purposive state action but also as its deliberate result. In two ways, this article expands existing research on the causes and consequences of institutional overlap. First, we establish that three different types of dissatisfaction may lead states to deliberately create institutional overlap: dissatisfaction with substantive norms and rules, dissatisfaction with decision-making rules and dissatisfaction with the institutional fit of an existing governance arrangement for a given cooperation problem. Each type of dissatisfaction triggers a distinct motivation for the creation of institutional overlap: to induce policy change, to increase influence on collective decision-making or to enhance governance effectiveness. Second, we demonstrate that whereas the motivation to induce policy change leads to interface conflicts, the motivations to increase influence on collective decision-making and to enhance governance effectiveness give rise to inter-institutional coordination. Three empirical case studies on global energy governance, the governance of global development banking and global environmental governance probe these analytical claims.
Highlights
On 26 January 2009, a group of states created the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) because it was dissatisfied with the focus of the International Energy Agency (IEA) on fossil fuels as the main energy sources.Consequences of institutional overlap in a disaggregated world order 269The creation of IRENA was driven by the desire to circumvent political opposition within the IEA and to shape new norms that promote renewable energies (Van de Graaf 2013a)
We demonstrate how interface conflicts have emerged between the proponents of the IEA and those of IRENA, and how inter-institutional coordination was realised between the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and between the Global Environment Facility (GEF), other international environmental institutions and the WB
To explain why the creation of IRENA led to interface conflicts, whereas the creation of the AIIB and the GEF resulted in inter-institutional coordination, we develop three causal mechanisms
Summary
On 26 January 2009, a group of states created the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) because it was dissatisfied with the focus of the International Energy Agency (IEA) on fossil fuels as the main energy sources. Existing research suggests that deliberately created institutional overlap virtually always leads to conflicts between groups of actors that support diverging norms and rules (Benvenisti and Downs 2007; Morse and Keohane 2014) It cannot account for the emergence of inter-institutional coordination in two of the three cases introduced above. This shortcoming is due to the fact that existing research does not delve into the different motivations of actors to create institutional overlap (de Búrca 2016) Against this backdrop, the present article develops three causal mechanisms that enable explaining why the creation of IRENA induced interface conflicts whereas the creation of the AIIB and the GEF resulted in interinstitutional coordination. We demonstrate how interface conflicts have emerged between the proponents of the IEA and those of IRENA, and how inter-institutional coordination was realised between the WB and the AIIB, and between the GEF, other international environmental institutions and the WB
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