Abstract

Abstract. The global crisis of 2020, caused by the spread of the COVID-19 coronavirus disease, has led to decline of the Ukrainian economy and contraction in the welfare of society. To overcome the effects of the crisis, the monetary and fiscal authorities have provided strong incentives, primarily to support the most vulnerable social groups and businesses most affected by quarantine restrictions, as well as to facilitate the financial stability of the banking sector. In conditions of limited government resources, to minimizing the negative effects of the crisis requires the highest efficiency of monetary and fiscal policies, which can only be achieved through proper coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities. The present article examines the peculiarities of the conduct and direction of monetary and fiscal policies before crisis processes arose in Ukraine and identifies the factors that constrain the effectiveness of both policies: shadow economy; permanent budget deficit; excessive public debt service costs; the dominance of non-monetary inflation factors in taking monetary policy decisions. Anti-crisis measures of monetary and fiscal authorities are described and analysed. It was determined that the stock exchange channel of money issuance stood inactive during the crisis, which led to a significant imbalance in the interest rate environment in Ukraine and to the increase in the cost of government borrowing in the domestic market, what was caused by poor coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. It has been established that the dominance of the state in the banking system of Ukraine has a negative impact on bank lending during the crisis, and the government’s program to stimulate lending restrains the reduction of interest rates on new loans through market mechanisms. To ensure post-crisis sustainable economic development, the following measures are advised: ensure a gradual reduction in public debt service costs; make the transition to a countercyclical fiscal policy, which will allow for an expansionary monetary policy; implement measures aimed at reducing the concentration of the state in the banking sector and endorse lending to the real sector of the economy rather than government, through state-owned banks; stimulating lending through monetary rather than fiscal mechanisms. Keywords: monetary policy, fiscal policy, monetary-fiscal policy coordination, economic development, central bank, corona crisis, Ukraine. JEL Classіfіcatіon E52, E62, E63, H12 Formulas: 0; fig.: 4; tabl.: 1; bibl.: 37.

Highlights

  • In 2020, the world entered a global crisis caused by the spread of SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, which led to a pandemic of a cute respiratory disease COVID-19

  • Monetary and fiscal stimulus was primarily aimed at mitigating the negative economic effects of the restrictions and supporting households and businesses, and was accompanied by increased government borrowing to cover budget deficits and the wide spread use of non-traditional monetary policy instruments

  • Fiscal and monetary authorities have responded to the challenges of the coronacrisis by easing their policies: fiscal policy measures have been directed to support the economy, while monetary policy has been more conducive to ensuring the financial stability of the banking system

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Summary

37. Introduction

In 2020, the world entered a global crisis caused by the spread of SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus, which led to a pandemic of a cute respiratory disease COVID-19. The implementation of such measures allowed companies to significantly reduce their loan servicing costs and banks to obtain higher interest income, fixing a higher interest margin than under standard market conditions, in general, the program significantly slowed down the reduction of the cost of lending in the Ukraine This was primarily due to the fact that the interest rate on the program «Affordable loans 5—7—9%» is formed as the sum between the Ukrainian index of interest rates on retail deposits (UIRD) for three months and the recommended by the Ministry of Finance maximum margin — 7 p.p. for microenterprises, 6 p.p. for small businesses and 5 p.p. for medium-sized enterprises [28]. Ukrainian practice testifies to the distortion of such logic: the yield on government bonds significantly exceeds the rates on term deposits of individuals and interest rates on loans to enterprises, while the pandemic factor and adjusted plan regarding attraction of additional funds to the state budget creates a favour able environment for investors to push interest rates upward (Table)

Domestic Sovereign Bonds
UAH billions Banks with ukrainian owners
Findings
Conclusions
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