Abstract
This paper investigates the coordination issue of a two-echelon fuzzy closed-loop supply chain. Two coordinating models with symmetric and asymmetric information about retailer’s collecting scale parameter are established by using game theory, and the corresponding analytical solutions are obtained. Theoretical analysis and numerical example show that the maximal expected profits of the fuzzy closed-loop supply chain in two coordination situations are equal to that in the centralized decision case and greater than that in the decentralized decision scenario. Furthermore, under asymmetric information contract, the maximal expected profit obtained by the low-collecting-scale-level retailer is higher than that under symmetric information contract.
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