Abstract
We propose a model of cancer initiation and progression where tumor growth is modulated by an evolutionary coordination game. Evolutionary games of cancer are widely used to model frequency-dependent cell interactions with the most studied games being the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Coordination games, by their more obscure and less evocative nature, are left understudied, despite the fact that, as we argue, they offer great potential in understanding and treating cancer. In this paper we present the conditions under which coordination games between cancer cells evolve, we propose aspects of cancer that can be modeled as results of coordination games, and explore the ways through which coordination games of cancer can be exploited for therapy.
Highlights
Cancer cells engage in evolutionary games [1, 2]
The heritable traits of the population change as cancer clades with more successful phenotypes outcompete and replace those with less successful ones [3]
We propose that Epidermal Growth Factor (EGFR)-mut versus EGFR WT lung cancers represent a coordination game
Summary
Cancer cells engage in evolutionary games [1, 2]. For them to do so, they must exhibit two dynamics and certain types of interactions. Cancer cells may engage in the Prisoner’s Dilemma [5, 6] and exhibit cooperation [7]. By producing VEGF for recruiting vasculature or creating acidic conditions as immune-suppression, the focal cancer cell benefits itself while benefiting neighbors [9, 10]. The most stringent subclass is called pure coordination games where positive payoffs are only attainable if all individuals choose the same strategy, for any other strategy combination all individuals receive zero payoffs. The original version of the game features two hunters who decide on which animal to hunt, stag or hare: if both choose stag, they are able to acquire it through a joint effort for a large reward, if any hunter chooses hare, they are able to acquire it individually for a lower reward, but if one chooses stag while the other chooses hare, the stag hunter fails and receives a payoff of zero
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