Abstract
Considering that the market demand is stochastic and dependent on effort, this essay shows that the benchmark revenue-sharing contract could not coordinate a three-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one distributor, and one retailer. By assuming that the retailer himself bears the effort cost, coordination is achieved by implementing revenue-sharing contract based on rebate and penalty policy in one transaction or two transactions of three-level supply chain, and the former is a special case of the latter. When the disruptions induce the changes of the market demand, the revenue-sharing contract could not coordinate the supply chain. To deal with the problem, this essay introduces two forms of improved revenue-sharing contracts which have antidisruption ability. The model of improved revenue-sharing contract is optimized when the market demand is in the additive form with effort dependent demand. Formulas are given to calculate the optimal contract parameters. Finally, this essay demonstrates the accuracy of the model of improved revenue-sharing contract with the help of numerical examples.
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