Abstract
Synchronization, cooperation, and chaos are ubiquitous phenomena in nature. In a population composed of many distinct groups of individuals playing the prisoner's dilemma game, there exists a migration dilemma: No cooperator would migrate to a group playing the prisoner's dilemma game lest it should be exploited by a defector; but unless the migration takes place, there is no chance of the entire population's cooperator-fraction to increase. Employing a randomly rewired coupled map lattice of chaotic replicator maps, modelling replication-selection evolutionary game dynamics, we demonstrate that the cooperators -- evolving in synchrony -- overcome the migration dilemma to proliferate across the population when altruism is mildly incentivized making few of the demes play the leader game.
Highlights
Cooperation has strong ethical, moral, philosophical, and even theological implications for the human [1]
First consider that the demes of the coupled map lattice (CML) are all of same type, i.e., same game is played at all the demes
Summarizing, we have provided a macroscopic description of the emergence of cooperation owing to the synchronization of chaos in a population split into a network of demes having random migration among them
Summary
Cooperation has strong ethical, moral, philosophical, and even theological implications for the human [1]. If they stay at the demes where the agents play the LG, the fraction of the cooperators cannot increase throughout the population and they would be surrounded by a lot of defectors present in the other demes This means that the cooperators would always be at the risk of being exploited by a free rider. To refer to this situation, we introduce the phrase, migration dilemma, which is fundamentally different from other known social dilemmas, such as the tragedy of commons (TOC) [26] and agglomeration dilemma [14]. Chaotically changing payoffs [40] may enhance cooperation; and in a turbulent aqueous environment, chaotic flows induce migration that may facilitate evolution of colonies via cooperation [41]
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