Abstract

Credit cooperatives were widespread in nineteenth-century Germany, which is surprising given that country's highly developed banking system. One general explanation for the success of credit cooperatives emphasizes their ability to capitalize on superior information and to impose inexpensive but effective sanctions on defaulters. These features supposedly permit cooperatives to lend to individuals whom banks would spurn, and to tailor loan terms more closely to borrowers' needs. I use the business records of several German credit cooperatives to test this claim. The results show that real efficiency advantages are at least part of the explanation for their success.

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