Cooperative Models in International Relations Research

Abstract

Introduction: Cooperative Models in International Relations M.D. Intriligator, U. Luterbacher. Part 1: Game Theory and Cooperation: General Aspects. 1. Sources in Game Theory for International Relations Specialists B. O'Neill. 2. On Coalition Games M. Shubik. 3. From Conflict to Cooperation in the Study of International Security M.D. Intriligator. 4. A Theory of Cooperation in the Triad U. Luterbacher. Part 2: Game Theory and Cooperation: Specific Applications. 5. International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers D. Snidal. 6. The Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory R. Powell. 7. Implementation through Sequential Unanimity Games J. Green, J.-J. Laffont. Part 3: Deterrence. 8. Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World B. Nalebuff. 9. A Question of Procedure at the Vienna Arms Talks B. O'Neill. Part 4: Escalation and Crises. 10. Limited Nuclear Options and the Dynamics of Escalation R. Powell. 11. Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining J.D. Morrow. 12. Are Crises Rational? A Game-Theoretic Analysis S.J. Brams, D.M. Kilgour. Part 5: Other Approaches to Modeling International Cooperation. 13. The Origin of Games: a Theory of the Formation of Ordinal Preferences and Games V.K. Aggarwal, P. Allan. 14. An Economic Analysis of Cooperation in the European Community S. Weber, H. Wiesmeth. 15. Labor Relations in International Comparison,or Why Humans (and Nations) Sometimes Cooperate and Sometimes Don't J.-C. Lambelet. Index.