Abstract
New applications in 5G networks are becoming very popular, and internet service providers (ISPs) may take the opportunity to provide various services to their clients. Today, one of the challenging problems facing ISPs is how the profitability can be increased while maintaining an excellent network performance. In this work, we seek to understand the fundamental issues on interactions among ISPs, and design a novel inter-ISP traffic control scheme to take full advantage of network resource sharing. Our approach explores the impact of ISP peering relationship and bandwidth allocation to maximize the total system revenue. Specifically, we identify the special properties of ISPs' interactions, and employ the concept of Yu bargaining solutions to address the ISP traffic control problem. This bargaining approach minimizes the Euclidean distance between the ISP's utopia payoff and the feasible solution set to provide a fair-efficient solution. The main novelty of our proposed scheme adaptively handling contradictory requirements while maximizing the network performance. To verify the benefits of our idea, we show the correctness of our scheme through carrying out extensive simulation experiments. Finally, several research challenges are discussed and open issues are also outlined.
Highlights
In recent years, the Internet has been evolving from a flatter structure to a hierarchical network platform due to the exponential increase in end user requests
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In this paper, we investigate the interplay among different internet service providers (ISPs), and develop a detailed methodology to solve the interISP traffic control problem
The service price of each ISP is dynamically decided according to the Yu bargaining solution (YBS)
Summary
The Internet has been evolving from a flatter structure to a hierarchical network platform due to the exponential increase in end user requests. S. Kim: Cooperative Inter-ISP Traffic Control Scheme Based on Bargaining Game Approach. For ISPs in the multi-tier platform, they need to sell or purchase the transit and peering services They set their prices based on the service provisioning and the amount of transferred traffic. Based on the concept of cooperative game theory, we formulate the price decision and bandwidth allocation problems as a twostep interactive bargaining game model. B. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS According to the two-step bargaining game model, we can effectively handle the inter-ISP traffic control problem. At the first-step game model, the service price of each individual ISP is dynamically decided according to the idea of YBS. At the second-step game model, each individual ISP distributes its limited bandwidth resource based on the basic idea of Weighted YBS (WYBS).
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