Cooperative driving model for non-signalized intersections with cooperative games

Abstract

Cooperative driving around intersections has aroused increasing interest in the last five years. Meanwhile, driving safety in non-signalized intersections has become an issue that has attracted attention globally. In view of the potential collision risk when more than three vehicles approach a non-signalized intersection from different directions, we propose a driving model using cooperative game theory. First, the characteristic functions of this model are primarily established on each vehicle’s profit function and include safety, rapidity and comfort indicators. Second, the Shapley theorem is adopted, and its group rationality, individual rationality, and uniqueness are proved to be suitable for the characteristic functions of the model. Following this, different drivers’ characteristics are considered. In order to simplify the calculation process, a zero-mean normalization method is introduced. In addition, a genetic algorithm method is adopted to search an optimal strategy set in the constrained multi-objective optimization problem. Finally, the model is confirmed as valid after simulation with a series of initial conditions.