Cooperative arrangements in comparative perspective

Abstract

Australia has a broad network of intergovernmental arrangements across almost every area of government activity. The growth of intergovernmental arrangements of various kinds has been fuelled by pressures for harmonisation and federal dominance of financial resources. This chapter examines intergovernmental arrangements in Australia, including recent governance changes to the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), ministerial councils and financial agreements. It suggests that, lacking a broad vision and principled framework, these initiatives fall short of providing adequate transparency and accountability, with adverse consequences for representative and responsible government and the rule of law. It may be that the time has now come to accept that intergovernmental arrangements and practices in Australia now represent a distinct mode of governance for which more structured provisions should be made, in the interests of federalism and constitutionalism more broadly. Drawing on insights from other federations facing similar problems, in particular Germany, the European Union and the United States, the chapter argues that Australia should adopt a formal, public and principled institutional framework for the network of intergovernmental ministerial councils; increase the involvement of parliaments in intergovernmental decision-making; and explore the possibility of a suitable constitutional amendment to provide the legal framework for a transparent, effective and genuinely cooperative intergovernmental schemes.