Abstract

With the continuous development of China's agriculture, individual farmers are increasingly integrating into the supply chain of agricultural products, leading to the emergence of "large agricultural households" in the agricultural market. These large households monopolize the local market by purchasing agricultural products from individual farmers, thereby greatly influencing the diversity of product types and brand image in the agricultural market. In this study, we utilize evolutionary game theory to construct a model that explores the cooperative evolution between large agricultural households and agricultural markets under limited rationality. We analyze the evolutionary process of the cooperative strategies between the two parties and validate the game results through Matlab simulation. The findings reveal that the decision of whether or not large agricultural households cooperate with agricultural markets is affected by various factors, such as the benefits and costs associated with cooperation, as well as the potential losses resulting from non-cooperation. As a result, agricultural markets can implement measures, such as establishing effective information sharing and communication coordination mechanisms, and reducing cooperation costs with large agricultural households, to attract and retain them.

Full Text
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