Cooperation in an Uncertain World: For the Maasai of East Africa, Need-Based Transfers Outperform Account-Keeping in Volatile Environments.

Athena Aktipis,Rolando De Aguiar,Anna Flaherty,Lee Cronk,Dennis Sonkoi,Padmini Iyer

doi:10.1007/s10745-016-9823-z

Athena Aktipis, Rolando De Aguiar + Show 4 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-016-9823-z

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Abstract

Using an agent-based model to study risk-pooling in herder dyads using rules derived from Maasai osotua (“umbilical cord”) relationships, Aktipis et al. (2011) found that osotua transfers led to more risk-pooling and better herd survival than both no transfers and transfers that occurred at frequencies tied to those seen in the osotua simulations. Here we expand this approach by comparing osotua-style transfers to another type of livestock transfer among Maasai known as esile (“debt”). In osotua, one asks if in need, and one gives in response to such requests if doing so will not threaten one’s own survival. In esile relationships, accounts are kept and debts must be repaid. We refer to these as “need-based” and “account-keeping” systems, respectively. Need-based transfers lead to more risk pooling and higher survival than account keeping. Need-based transfers also lead to greater wealth equality and are game theoretically dominant to account-keeping rules.

Highlights

People everywhere have to deal with both predictable and unpredictable risks to their livelihoods
Because many pastoralists other than the Maasai have rules that are equivalent to osotua and esile (Almagor 1978; Bollig 1998, 2010; Dyson-Hudson 1966; Flannery et al 1989; Gulliver 1955), in an effort to generalize our terminology we will refer to these not by their Maa labels but rather as Bneed-based transfers^ and Baccount keeping.^ Here we examine the underlying logic of both account keeping and need-based transfers and use an agent-based model to compare them in terms of their ability to enhance survival in volatile environmental conditions
We found that pairs of need-based transfer individuals had higher rates of herd survival than accountkeeping pairs or pairs in which partners did not transfer resources (Fig. 2)

Summary

Introduction

People everywhere have to deal with both predictable and unpredictable risks to their livelihoods. Because many pastoralists other than the Maasai have rules that are equivalent to osotua and esile (Almagor 1978; Bollig 1998, 2010; Dyson-Hudson 1966; Flannery et al 1989; Gulliver 1955), in an effort to generalize our terminology we will refer to these not by their Maa labels but rather as Bneed-based transfers^ and Baccount keeping.^ Here we examine the underlying logic of both account keeping and need-based transfers and use an agent-based model to compare them in terms of their ability to enhance survival in volatile environmental conditions. Based on estimates of a family’s caloric needs and productivity in the dry season (Dahl and Hjort 1976), we set the minimum size of a viable herd at 64 This is high compared to the living standards of some Maa-speaking pastoralists (e.g., Cronk 2004), the exact number is not important so long as it is consistent across all conditions. That model was constructed to examine herd survival in volatile ecological conditions characteristic of East African pastoralism

Requests made

Discussion

Conclusion

Transfers are made:

Findings

Design Concepts