Abstract
Most human relationships are characterized by reciprocal patterns of give-and-take that can be studied using a decision-making task called the Centipede game. The game involves 2 players alternating in choosing between cooperation and defection, with their choices affecting payoffs to themselves and the co-player. We compared trust and cooperation of Japanese and U.K. samples in the Centipede game. To increase the game’s applicability to real-life decision situations, we added 3 treatment conditions to manipulate payoff information. Our between-subjects design comprised the following 4 conditions: (a) full payoff information, (b) full payoff information framed as percentages, (c) partial payoff information with absolute (own payoff) information only, and (d) partial payoff information with relative information only. Comparing Japanese and U.K. students’ decisions, the Japanese cooperated significantly more frequently than the British. The manipulation of payoff information also affected decision making. In Japan, both treatment conditions with incomplete information yielded significantly higher cooperation levels than the control. In the U.K., only the condition with absolute payoff information produced significantly higher cooperativeness. Overall, these findings suggest that Japanese samples cooperate more frequently in repeated interactions than British samples and that this may be due to the assurance-based trust elicited by reciprocal relationships that has been identified as a typical feature of Japanese culture. In situations with incomplete information, expectations about the stake size may guide decision making, with lower expectations resulting in higher cooperation levels.
Highlights
In the face of rapid globalization, international collaboration is key for ensuring economic growth and progress
Traditional game theory claims this final GO move to be irrational and constructs a mathematical argument around it that rules out any cooperation at all in the Centipede game, instead mandating an immediate STOP move at Node 1
This study reports the first cross-cultural experiment on decision making in the sequential Centipede game comparing Japanese and UK nationals, and the findings relate to four treatment conditions that differed in the amount of payoff information provided
Summary
In the face of rapid globalization, international collaboration is key for ensuring economic growth and progress. Examples are partnerships between the US computer and Japanese automotive industry as well as UK–Japanese collaborations in the robotics sector In these global examples of repeated, reciprocal interactions, cultural differences may play an important role that could affect cooperation and, the success of international collaborations. The game provides a dynamic model for reciprocal human relationships, where Player A and Player B—representing either individual decision makers or larger entities such as groups, business firms, or even states—alternate in deciding whether to cooperate (e.g., invest expertise and resources in a joint project) or to defect (e.g., exit a business partnership). Some of the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s shortcomings are overcome in the iterated or repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, a dynamic variation comprising a series of identical one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemmas with the same co-player Even in this dynamic game version, decisions are still made simultaneously without knowledge of the other player’s choice. Traditional game theory claims this final GO move to be irrational and constructs a mathematical argument around it that rules out any cooperation at all in the Centipede game, instead mandating an immediate STOP move at Node 1 (see Aumann, 1995, 1998; Colman, Krockow, Frosch, & Pulford, 2017, for detailed discussions of the so-called backward induction argument)
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
