Cooperation and punishment in an adversarial game: How defectors pave the way to a peaceful society

Abstract

The evolution of human cooperation has been the subject of much research, especially within the framework of evolutionary public goods games, where several mechanisms have been proposed to account for persistent cooperation. Yet, in addressing this issue, little attention has been given to games of a more adversarial nature, in which defecting players, rather than simply free riding, actively seek to harm others. Here, we develop an adversarial evolutionary game using the specific example of criminal activity, recasting the familiar public goods strategies of punishers, cooperators, and defectors in this light. We then introduce a strategy-the informant-with no clear analog in public goods games and show that individuals employing this strategy are a key to the emergence of systems where cooperation dominates. We also find that a defection-dominated regime may be transitioned to one that is cooperation-dominated by converting an optimal number of players into informants. We discuss these findings, the role of informants, and possible intervention strategies in extreme adversarial societies, such as those marred by wars and insurgencies.