Abstract
The negative effects of the lack of cooperation in managing shared or transboundary fishing resources may be studied by means of analyses that combine Game Theory with bioeconomic modelling. In this paper we undertake the study of the Ibero-atlantic sardine stock, shared by Spain and Portugal, adapting the basic model of analysis of transboundary resources to the facts found in this fishery. One of the main findings is that the final results will depend on the different assumptions we make regarding the behaviour of the fishermen in the competitive scenario. Besides, a cooperative solution is proved to be more likely provided that side payments are allowed. Moreover, the optimal cooperative solution does not necessarily mean that the resource will be harvested exclusively by one of the fleets in the fishery.
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