Abstract
This article analyzes the potential role of moral motivation in collective action. It is suggested that moral motivation works very differently from the social norms of reciprocity that have been studied in behavioral economics. A new utility function, combining the traditional arguments of the literature on collective action and a moral factor, is presented. In moral terms, the agent increases or decreases its utility depending on how much it deviates from the social average level of cooperation. Moral utility may transform the Prisoner’s Dilemma into a game more favourable to cooperation. Finally, some implications from the model are drawn with regard to the crowding out effect and the concept of personal sacrifice.
Highlights
This article analyzes the potential role of moral motivation in collective action
It is suggested that moral motivation works
differently from the social norms of reciprocity that have been studied in behavioral economics
Summary
En este trabajo se analiza el papel potencial de las motivaciones morales en la acción colectiva. Se sugiere que la motivación moral puede funcionar de manera distinta a las normas sociales de reciprocidad que se han estudiado en la economía del comportamiento. Se presenta una nueva función de utilidad que integra los componentes clásicos de la literatura de acción colectiva y en la que se añade un componente moral. El agente aumenta o disminuye su utilidad en función de cuánto se desvíe con respecto a la media social de cooperación. Se muestra cómo la utilidad moral puede modificar un Dilema del Prisionero en otros juegos más favorables para la cooperación. Finalmente, se presentan algunas implicaciones del modelo con respecto al efecto crowding out y al concepto de sacrificio personal
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