Cooling-Off Periods in the Consumer Laws of the EC Member States. A Comparative Law and Economics Approach

Abstract

Lawyers tend to see cooling-off periods in consumer laws as a remedy for the problems caused by unequal bargaining power between sellers of goods and consumers. This article takes a different approach and argues that cooling-off periods can be seen as efficiency-enhancing devices. From an economic point of view, cooling-off periods provide a remedy for irrational behaviour on the part of consumers and may cure market failures, in particular problems caused by situational monopolies and asymmetric information. In spite of these important benefits, the economic approach also warns against possible disadvantages. The latter range from a moral hazard problem on the side of the consumer to the adverse counter-productive effects of cooling-off periods. A legislator who is informed by economic analysis may design cooling-off periods in ways that maximise their ability to cure inefficiencies and at the same time minimise their potential detrimental effects. Unfortunately, the relevant EC Directives and the current consumer laws of the Member States are not in perfect harmony with an efficiency enhancing-approach.